美聯儲失敗的貨幣政策
伯南克和我很少有共同之處，但是有一種觀點我們都認同：任何形式的恢複都是建立在信心之上。消費者信心的恢複會增加消費，尤其是汽車、房子、家具等大宗消費；企業信心的恢複對於增加新廠房、設備投資、企業創新性和增加就業都很有必要，企業需要信心去投資價格合理的新項目。不確定性抑制了就業的增長。
我們的分歧在於如何恢複信心。他的觀點是，當前的通貨膨脹率太低，而高通脹有利於就業。高通脹可以通過國庫購買（債券）等方式給經濟註入資金。他指出：“經驗表明，我們以前的證券購買計劃可以成功的降低長期利率，從而有利於經濟複蘇。”盡管這或許有可能降低長期利率，但是他說的有利於經濟複蘇，是如何得出的？低利率可以創造就業機會？不；低利率可以激發投資？不；可以提高消費者信心？不。
量化寬松政策（QE）迄今取得了什麼進展？
快速浏覽一下美聯儲的資產負債表你會發現，美聯儲在2008年9月至2010年3月之間向金融系統註入了1.4萬億的流動性
我們看一下美聯儲措施的效果如何：失業率上升而不是按照預期的下降。
其原因在於銀行貸款。銀行資產自2008年9月快速上升，緊接著影子銀行系統的崩潰，貸款和租賃逐漸縮水，跌幅超過一萬億美元。這清楚的表明商業投資也沒有上升。
作為銀行資產的一部分，證券化貸款也包括在内。
貨幣刺激政策並沒有阻止銀行信貸的收縮。那麼，資金去哪了？ 1萬億左右的美元作為超額準備金又回到了美聯儲。剩下的資金被銀行投資在國債和機構證券。這些資金都沒有流入到私人投資者的口袋。
關鍵的兩個S（stimulus刺激，stability穩定）
美聯儲似乎還沒有意識到經濟刺激不是解決方法。在過去的三十年中，它使盡渾身解數試圖去操控經濟的發展，成功的讓經濟波動起來但是卻始終談不是去控制經濟發展。美聯儲成功的擊敗了保守派的投資策略，同時又導致了投機行為的大規模盛行。
恢複信心的核心是穩定。企業需要穩定的經濟環境來提升投資信心。利率的不斷變化和就業率的惡化，使得企業無法準確的估算出產出成本；只有在經濟穩定的情況下，消費者才能有足夠的財務能力對未來的支出做出預算；低通貨膨脹環境也有利於投資者，他們可以投資金融產品，不用擔心他們的資金會被美聯儲蠶食。
這要求目前看起來有點高，但是我們需要的是一個對經濟穩定的長期承諾。以中等利率（平衡利率）為目標，並為之不懈努力，實現經濟長期平穩發展。
要把信貸的增長視為威脅而不是目標。過去出現了大量的房地產泡沫、股市泡沫、甚至證券市場泡沫，本質上這些都是債務泡沫。如果沒有低利率促使信貸的快速增長，那麼任何形式的泡沫都將不複存在。如果你單獨的調查過去這些年市場的運作情況，任何情況下都是貨幣政策的擴張刺激促進某一種資產的繁榮。資產種類可以有所不同，但是最根本的原因都是由寬松的貨幣政策和低利率。
如果你單獨調查的狂熱，市場已經如此戲稱，多年來，在任何情況下，它是生成的熱潮在資產擴張性貨幣政策。該特定資產變化從一個臂到另一個。但基本的底層傳播是過於寬松的貨幣政策和過低的利率.....
〜美國貨幣史 安娜•施瓦茨、米爾頓•弗裡德曼（1963年）。
經濟發展越穩定，私人投資規模就會越大，企業發展也會越好、長期的就業也就越穩定---有別於政府經濟刺激政策帶來的一時的就業增長。
問題是，美聯儲一直使用相同的貨幣工具（由聯邦公開市場委員會監督公開市場操作）這麼久，他們已成為盤踞在系統中。他們甚至不打算承認，他們的工具不再有效。如果一味地堅持使用他們，我們正在走向更大的災難。
聯邦公開市場委員會的確立
美聯儲自成立以來一直採用同樣的貨幣政策（公開市場操作），它也不準備承認這一政策無法發揮作用。如果美聯儲一直延續該作法，那麼我們將陷入更大的災難中。
雖然利率差不多已經接近零，但是銀行的借貸規模仍然持續的縮減，失業率也在上升。從上面的國債表中我們可以看到，美聯儲已經沒有調控市場的空間了。自20世紀80年代初，每一個經濟低谷都要求更低的利率刺激其發展。現在利率已經接近零，但經濟發展絲毫沒有反映。美聯儲主席沒有因此懷疑公開市場操作的有效性，而是採取行動提升通貨膨脹率，為促進借貸做最後的努力。
核心措施
如果銀行不放貸、企業不借貸，美聯儲將如何提高通貨膨脹率？美聯儲的最後措施是直接從政府購買國債而不是從私人投資者。世紀上，美聯儲也在大量發行貨幣以彌補財政赤字。這不是長久之計，效果也只是將經濟從一個泡沫帶到了另一個泡沫中。通貨膨脹會進一步侵蝕“信心”，並導致經濟更加的不穩定。美聯儲所採取的這一措施在日本近二十年期間都沒產生效果，在美國也不會適用。
大蕭條不是天災也不是由資本主義社會固有矛盾引起的，直接的原因是經濟政策制訂者錯誤決策，一些是在20世紀20年代，另外一些是在第一危機發生後，不管以何種標準判斷，大蕭條都是金融官員對經濟運行規律的錯誤判斷累積而成的。
大蕭條是不是神的一些行為和資本主義的一些深層次矛盾的結果，而是一系列的誤判經濟政策制定者的直接結果，取得了一些早在20世紀20年代，別人的第一危機後，在設置 - 按任何標準的集體失誤的最引人註目的序列有史以來財政官員。比什麼都重要，因此，大蕭條是由發生故障的智力意志，缺乏了解有關如何對經濟運行造成的。
金融之王 利雅卡特•艾哈邁德
The Fed's Failed Monetary Policy
Ben Bernanke and I have little in common, but we share the view that any form of recovery is dependent on confidence. Recovery of consumer confidence would lead to an increase in consumer spending, especially on big ticket items like cars, homes and furniture. Business confidence is likewise a necessity to increase investment in new plant and equipment and new ventures that lift employment. Investor confidence is also needed for business to finance new investment at a reasonable cost. Uncertainty inhibits jobs growth.
Where we differ is in how to restore confidence. His view is that inflation is too low and that higher inflation would encourage creation of new jobs. And could be achieved by injecting further money into the system, through Treasury purchases. He recently observed: "Empirical evidence suggests that our previous program of securities purchases was successful in bringing down longer-term interest rates and thereby supporting the economic recovery." While asset purchases may have lowered longer-term interest rates, what does he mean by itsupported the economic recovery? Did lower interest rates create new jobs? No. Did it spur new investment? No. Did it raise consumer confidence? No.
What has QE achieved so far?
A quick look at the Fed's balance sheet shows that they injected $1.4 trillion into the financial system between September 2008 and March 2010.
Lets see how well that worked. The jobless rate climbed instead of falling as projected.
The reason for that lies with bank lending. Since the dramatic rise in bank assets in September 2008, following the collapse of the shadow banking system, loans and leases have steadily shrunk*, falling more than a trillion dollars. That clearly indicates there has been no up-turn in business investment.
Monetary stimulus did not arrest the contraction of bank credit. So where did the money go? About $1 trillion was deposited back with the Fed as excess reserve deposits. And another half trillion was invested by banks in Treasury and Agency Securities. None of this flowed into new private investment.
The S-word
What the Fed does not seem to realize is that stimulus is not the answer. In their attempts to manipulate the economy for the last three decades, with all the finesse of a bull in a china shop, they have succeeded in fostering massive volatility which is now proving difficult to tame. Destroying conservative investment strategies and encouraging speculation on a massive scale.
The key to restoring confidence is stability. Businesses need a stable environment in which to invest with confidence. It is impossible for them to make accurate forecasts with unstable exchange rates, uncertain input costs, volatile inflation rates and worsening employment levels. Consumers also need a stable employment environment before they can take on additional financial commitments. And both need a stable interest rate environment so the rug is not pulled out from under their feet when they are committed. Investors also thrive in a stable, low inflation environment — where they can invest in financial assets without fear of their capital beingtermited by the Fed.
That may seem a tall order in the present environment, but what is needed is a long-term commitment to stability. Target a mid-range (equilibrium) interest rate and stick to it. Resist the temptation to juice up the economy when it is flat, so they will not be forced to slam on the brakes when it overheats.
View rapid debt growth as a threat, not an objective. A great deal has been written in recent years about real estate bubbles, stock market bubbles and even bond market bubbles. But there is really only one kind of bubble — that is a debt bubble. Without low interest rates fueling rapid debt growth any form of bubble would wither on the vine.
If you investigate individually the manias that the market has so dubbed over the years, in every case, it was expansive monetary policy that generated the boom in an asset. The particular asset varied from one boom to another. But the basic underlying propagator was too-easy monetary policy and too-low interest rates .....
~ Anna Schwartz co-author with Milton Friedman of A Monetary History of the United States (1963).
The more you foster stability, the more you will encourage private investment and business expansion. And the more you will generate permanent jobs — not the here-today-gone-tomorrow kind conjured up by government stimulus programs.
FOMC entrenched
The problem is that the Fed has been using the same monetary tools (open-market operations supervised by the FOMC) for so long that they have become entrenched in the system. They are not even prepared to acknowledge that their tools no longer work. If they blindly persist with them, we are headed for even greater disaster.
Having lowered interest rates to practically zero, bank lending continues to contract and the jobless rate is rising. The Fed is running out of room to maneuver, as we can see from the above chart of Treasury yields. Since the early 1980s, each successive trough required lower short-term interest rates to stimulate the economy. Now rates are close to zero and the economy is not responding. Rather than question the efficacy of their strategy, however, the chairman is now advocating that the Fed take action to lift the inflation rate — in a last ditch effort to induce further borrowing.
The nuclear option
How can the Fed lift the inflation rate if banks won't lend and businesses won't borrow? Their last available resort is the nuclear option, buying Treasurys directly from the government, rather than from private investors. In effect the Fed prints new money to fund the federal budget deficit. But creating another bubble to save us from the consequences of the last one is not a long-term solution. Inflation will further erode confidence and generate even greater instability. The path being followed by the Fed failed to work in Japan for the last two decades and is unlikely to work here.
The Great Depression was not some Act of God or the result of some deep-rooted contradictions of capitalism, but the direct result of a series of misjudgements by economic policy makers, some made back in the 1920s, others after the first crises set in — by any measure the most dramatic sequence of collective blunders ever made by financial officials. More than anything else, therefore, the Great Depression was caused by a failure of intellectual will, a lack of understanding about how the economy operated.
~ Lords of Finance by Liaquat Ahamed
本文翻譯由兄弟財經提供，文章來源：http://www.incrediblecharts.com/economy/fed_monetary_policy.php