“像做生意一樣對待投資，是最聰明的。”– 本·格雷厄姆，《聰明的投資者》
引用本·格雷厄姆的話作為這封信的開場白是合適的，因為我很感激能從他那了解到關於投資的想法。我在後面會談到本，甚至很快會談到普通股，但首先我想和你聊聊，在很久以前我曾做過的兩個小小的非股票投資。盡管它們都沒有明顯地改變我的淨值，但還是能帶來些啟發的。
這 故事始於1973至1981年的内佈拉斯加州，當時美國中西部的農場價格暴漲，因為大家普遍認為惡性通貨膨脹要來了，而且小鄉鎮銀行的貸款政策還火上澆 油。然後泡沫爆了，導致價格下跌50%甚至更多，摧毀了那些舉債經營的農民和他們的債主。在那場泡沫餘波中倒閉的愛荷華州和内佈拉斯加州的銀行，數量比我 們最近這次大蕭條中倒閉的還要多五倍。
在1986年，我從FDIC（聯邦存款保險公司）那買下了一個400英畝的農場，坐落在奧馬哈北部 50英裡處。這花了我28萬，此價格比前幾年一家倒閉了的銀行批給農場的貸款還要少得多。我根本不懂怎樣去經營一個農場，好在有個熱愛農活的兒子。我從他 那得知這農場能生產多少蒲式耳的玉米和大豆，經營費用會是多少。通過這些預估，我計算出這農場當時大概能有10%的正常回報。我還認為生產力會隨時間而提 高，農作物價格也會越來越高。後來這些預期都得到了印證。
我不需要有與衆不同的知識或智商來得出結論，這項投資不會有向下的趨勢，而是有 潛在的，會實質向好的趨勢。當然了，可能偶爾會歉收，或是價格有時讓人失望。那又如何？總會有些非常好的年份嘛，我完全不會有任何壓力去賣掉這塊資產。現 在，28年過去了，這農場的收入翻了三倍，它的價值已是我支付價格的五倍甚至更多。我還是對農活一無所知，最近才第二次去實地看了看。
在 1993年，我做了另外一個小投資。那時我還是所羅門的CEO，所羅門的房東賴瑞·西弗史丹告訴我，有個清算信托公司打算要賣掉紐約大學鄰近的一塊商業地 產。泡沫再次爆破了，這次波及到商業地產，這個清算信托公司專門用於處置那些倒閉儲蓄機構的資產，正是這些機構樂觀的貸款政策助長了這場鬧劇。
這 裡的分析依舊簡單。就像那農場的例子中，該資產的無槓桿當期收益率大約為10%。但資產正被清算信托公司低效率經營著，如果把一些空置的商店出租，它的收 入將會增加。更重要的是，占地產項目約20%面積的最大租戶支付的租金大約為5美元一英尺，而其他租戶平均為70美元。9年後，這份廉價租約的到期肯定會 帶來收入的顯著增長。這資產的位置也是極好的，畢竟紐約大學跑不了。
我加入了一個小團體來收購這棟樓，賴瑞和佛瑞德·羅斯也在其中。佛瑞 德是個有經驗的高級房地產投資者，他和他的家族將管理這項資產。這些年也確實由他們經營著。隨著舊租約的到期，收入翻了三倍，現在的年分紅已超過我們初始 投資額的35%。此外，原始抵押分別在1996年和1999年被再融資，這種手段允許進行了幾次特別分紅，加起來超過了我們投資額度的150%。我到今天 為止還沒去看過這項資產。
從那農場和紐約大學房地產獲得的收入，很可能未來幾十年内還會增長。盡管收益並不具有戲劇性，但這兩項投資卻是可靠且令人滿意的，我會一輩子持有，然後傳給我的孩子和孫子。
我說這些故事是為了闡明一些投資的基礎原則：
· 獲得令人滿意的投資回報並不需要你成為一名專家。但如果你不是，你必須認清自己的局限性並遵循一套可行的方法。保持簡單，不要孤註一擲。當別人向你承諾短期的暴利，你要學會趕緊說“不”。
· 聚焦於擬投資資產的未來生產力。如果你對某資產的未來收入進行了粗略估算，卻又感到不安，那就忘了它繼續前進吧。沒人能估算出每一項投資的可能性。但沒必要當個全能者；你只要能理解自己的所作所為就可以了。
· 如果你是聚焦於擬投資資產的未來價格變動，那你就是在投機。這本身沒什麼錯。但我知道我無法成功投機，並對那些宣傳自己能持續成功的投機者表示 懷疑。有一半人第一次扔銅闆時能壓對寶；但這些勝利者如果繼續玩下去，沒人能擁有贏利為正的期望值。事實上，一項既定資產最近的價格上漲，永遠都不會是買 入的理由。
· 通過我的兩個小投資可以看出，我只會考慮一項資產能產出什麼，而完全不關心它們的每日定價。聚焦於賽場的人才能贏得比賽，勝者不會是那些緊盯記分闆的人。如果你能好好享受週六週日而不看股價，那工作日也試試吧。
· 形成自己的宏觀觀點，或是聽別人對宏觀或市場進行預測，都是在浪費時間。事實上這是危險的，因為這可能會模糊你的視野，讓你看不清真正重要的事 實。（當我聽到電視評論員油嘴滑舌地對市場未來走勢進行臆想，我就回想起了米奇·曼托的尖酸評論：“你都不知道這遊戲有多簡單，直到你走進那個演播 廳。”）
我的兩項購買分別是在1986年和1993年完成。決定進行這些投資的時候，當時的經濟狀況、利率或是下一年（1987和 1994年）的證券市場走勢，對我來說都不重要。我已經記不起當時的頭條新聞，或是權威人士說了些什麼，不管別人怎麼說，内佈拉斯加州的玉米一直在生長， 學生也會聚集在紐約大學。
在我的兩個小投資和股票投資之間，有個重要的區別。那就是股票會讓你知道所持股份的實時定價，而我卻從沒見過對我農場或紐約房地產的報價。
證 券市場的投資者有個極大的優勢，那就是他們的持股有寬幅波動的估值。對於一些投資者來說，確實如此。畢竟，如果一個穆迪的朋友，每天圍著我的財產對我喊出 報價，願意以此報價來買我的農場，或將他的農場賣給我，並且這些報價會根據他的精神狀態，在短期内劇烈變化，我到底該怎樣利用他這種不規律的行為來獲利？ 如果他的日報價令人可笑地低，並且我有閑錢，我就會買下他的農場。如果他喊出的報價荒謬地高，我要麼就賣給他，或是繼續耕種。
然而，股票的持有者往往容易被其他持股者的反複無常和不理性所影響，搞到自己也不理性。因為市場上的噪音太多了，包括經濟狀況、利率、股票的價格等等。一些投資者認為聽權威人士的意見很重要，更糟糕的是，還認為參考他們的評論來投資很重要。
那些擁有農場或房子的人，能夠默默持有資產幾十年，但當他們接觸到大量的股票報價，加上評論員總在暗示“別一直坐著，來買賣吧！”，他們往往就會變得狂熱起來。對於這些投資者來說，流動性本來是可以擁有的絕對優勢，現在卻變成了一種詛咒。
一 個閃電崩盤或是其他極端的市場震蕩，對投資者所造成的傷害，並不會比一個古怪且愛說話的鄰居對我農場投資的傷害來得大。事實上，下跌的市場對真正的投資者 來說，是有幫助的，如果當價格遠低於價值的時候，他手裡還有錢可用的話。在投資的時候，恐懼的氛圍是你的朋友；一個歡快的世界卻是你的敵人。
在 2008年底發生的，嚴重的金融恐慌期間，即使一個嚴峻衰退正在明顯地形成，我也從未想過要賣出我的農場或是紐約房地產。如果我100%擁有一項具良好長 期前景的穩固生意，對我來說，哪怕是稍微考慮要抛售它，都會是非常愚蠢的。我持有的股票就是好生意的一小部分，那為什麼要賣出呢？準確的說，每一小部分或 許最後會讓人失望，但作為一個整體，他們一定能做好。難道有人真的相信，地球會吞沒美國驚人的生產性資產和無限的人類創造性？
當查理·芒 格和我買股票時，我們會把它當成是生意的一部分，我們的分析與買下整個生意時所思考的内容非常相似。我們一開始會判斷自己能否容易地估計出，資產未來五年 或更久的收入範圍。如果答案是肯定的，並且處於與我們估算底線相對應的合理價格内，我們就會購買這股票（或生意）。但是，如果我們沒有能力估算出未來的收 入（經常會遇到這種情況），我們就會簡單地繼續前行，繼續尋找下一個潛在標的。在我們一起合作的54年裡，我們從未因宏觀或政治環境，或其他人的看法，而 放棄具有吸引力的收購。事實上，當我們做決定時，這類因素想都沒想過。
但至關重要的是，我們認清了自身的能力圈邊界，並乖乖地呆在裡面。即使這樣，我們還是在股票上和生意上都犯了些錯誤。但它們發生時都不是災難型的，例如在一個長期上升的市場中，基於預期價格行為和欲望導致了購買。
當然，大多數投資者並沒有把商業前景研究當作是生活中的首要任務。如果夠明智的話，他們會知道自己對具體生意的了解不足，並不能預測出他們未來的獲利能力。
我 給這些非專業人士帶來了好消息：典型的投資者並不需要這些技巧。總的來說，美國的商業一直做得很好，以後也會繼續好下去（然而可以肯定的是，會有不可預測 的忽冷忽熱出現）。在20世紀，道瓊斯工業指數從66上漲到11497，不斷上升的股利支付推動了市場的發展。21世紀，將可以看到更多的盈利，幾乎必然 會有大量的收獲。非專業人士的目標不應是挑選出大牛股，他或他的外援都是辦不到的，但應該持有各種生意的一部分，總的合起來就會有很好的表現。一個低成本 的S&P500指數基金就能滿足這個目標。
這是對非專業人士說的“投資是什麼”。“什麼時候投資”也是很重要的。最危險的是膽小 的或新手的投資者在市場極度繁榮的時候入場，然後看到賬面虧損了才醒悟。（想起巴頓·比格斯最近的觀察：“牛市就像性愛，在結束前的感覺最好。”）投資者 解決這類錯時交易的方法是，在一段長時間内積攢股份，並永遠不要在出現壞消息和股價遠低於高點時賣出。遵循這些原則，“什麼都不懂”的投資者不僅做到了多 樣化投資，還能保持成本最小化，這幾乎就能確信，可以獲得令人滿意的結果。實際上，相對於那些知識淵博，但連自身弱點都看不清的專業投資者，一個能實事求 是面對自己短處的純樸投資者可能會獲得更好的長期回報。
如果“投資者”瘋狂買賣彼此的農地，產量和農作物的價格都不會增長。這些行為的唯一結果就是，由於農場擁有者尋求建議和轉換資產屬性而導致的大量的成本，會使總的收入下降。
然而，那些能從提供建議或產生交易中獲利的人，一直在催促個人和機構投資者要變得積極。這導致的摩擦成本變得很高，對於投資者來說，總體是全無好處的。所以，忽視這些噪音吧，保持你的成本最小化，投資那些股票就像投資你願意投資的農場一樣。
我 該補充一下，我的財富就在我嘴裡：我在這裡提出的建議，本質上與我在遺囑裡列出的一些指令是相同的。通過一個遺囑，去實現把現金交給守護我老婆利益的托管 人。我對托管人的建議再簡單不過了：把10%的現金用來買短期政府債券，把90%用於購買非常低成本的S&P500指數基金（我建議是先鋒基金 VFINX）。我相信遵循這些方針的信托，能比聘用昂貴投資經理的大多數投資者，獲得更優的長期回報，無論是養老基金、機構還是個人。
現在說回本·格雷厄姆。我在1949年買了本所著的《聰明的投資者》，並通過書中的投資探讨，學到了他大部分的想法。我的金融生涯隨著買到的這本書而改變了。
在 讀本的書之前，我仍在投資的環境外徘徊，鲸吞著所有關於投資的書面資料。我閱讀的大多數内容都使我著迷：我嘗試過親手畫圖，用市場標記來預測股票走勢。我 坐在經紀公司的辦公室，看著股票報價帶卷動，我還聽評論員的講解。這些都是有趣的，但我並不為之顫抖，因為我還什麼都不懂。
相反地，本的想法能用簡練易懂的平凡文字，有邏輯地去闡明（沒有希臘字母或複雜的公式）。對我來說，關鍵點就是最新版第八章和第二十章的内容，這些觀點引導著我今日的投資決策。
關 於這本書的幾個有趣花絮：最新版包括了一個附錄，裡面描述了一個未被提及的投資，是關於本的幸運投資的。本在1948年，當他寫第一版書的時候進行了收 購，註意了，這個神秘的公司就是政府雇員保險公司Geico。如果本當時沒有看出還處於初創期的Geico的特質，我的未來和伯克希爾都將會大大的不同。
這 本書1949年的版本還推薦了一個鐵路股，當時賣17美元，每股盈利為10美元。（我佩服本的一個原因就是他有膽量使用當前的例子，如果說錯了就會讓自己 成為被嘲諷的對象。）某種程度上，低估值是由於當時的會計準則造成的，那時候並不要求鐵路公司在賬面盈餘中體現出子公司的大量盈餘。
被推薦的股票就是北太平洋公司，它最重要的子公司是芝加哥,伯靈頓和昆西。這些鐵路現在是北伯林頓鐵路公司的重要組成部分，而伯克希爾現今完全擁有北伯林頓鐵路公司。當我讀這本書的時候，北太平洋公司的市值約為4000萬美元，現在它的繼承者每四天就能賺這麼多了。
我已記不起當時花了多少錢來買《聰明的投資者》的第一版。無論花了多少錢，都可以強調出本的格言：價格是你支付出去的，價值是你所獲得的。我做過的所有投資當中，買本的書就是最好的投資（我買的那兩本結婚證除外）。
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原文如下：
Buffett’s annual letter: What you can learn from my real estate investments
“Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” –Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this essay because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small nonstock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath as in our recent Great Recession.
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming, and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop, and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to New York University that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped — this one involving commercial real estate — and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant — who occupied around 20% of the project’s space — was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
I joined a small group — including Larry and my friend Fred Rose — in purchasing the building. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our initial equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field — not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following — 1987 and 1994 — was of no importance to me in determining the success of those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings, whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings — and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his — and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state — how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits — and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there — do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
When Charlie Munger and I buy stocks — which we think of as small portions of businesses — our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings — which is usually the case — we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never forgone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
I have good news for these nonprofessionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th century, the Dow Jones industrial index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the nonprofessional should not be to pick winners — neither he nor his “helpers” can do that — but should rather be to own a cross section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
That’s the “what” of investing for the nonprofessional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’s observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to one another, neither the yields nor the prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the 10 years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s. (VFINX)) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors — whether pension funds, institutions, or individuals — who employ high-fee managers.
And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. These points guide my investing decisions today.
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and — brace yourself — the mystery company was Geico. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of Geico when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay; value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).