Russ Koesterich 2015年8月29日
大多數經濟學家和投資者明白在2008年危機之後美國消費者需要一段時間來修複其嚴重超支的資產負債表。但是在信貸泡沫破裂七年後，事情變化也不是很大。即使就業增長迅速且油價大幅下跌，消費者的反映不是很劇烈。
雖然經濟衰退在2009年就已經結束，美國真實家庭消費仍低於歷史平均水平。在1947到2007的60年間，家庭消費平均每年增長3.6%。到2008年，下降到大約1.5%。即使排除經濟衰退，平均水平仍然僅在2.3%左右。
這個下降一部分是測量問題。在一個服務驅動的共享消費中，測量經濟變得更加困難。也就是說，很難反駁一些已經改變的事實。
事實上，正如我在最新的《市場觀點》報紙上寫到的：“消費的放緩早於經濟危機。事實上，美國家庭面臨的挑戰是幾個長期趨勢，不會很快消失。”
一個這樣的趨勢：工資停滞不前。在經濟衰退之前，就業和工資增長之間有一個非常一致和顯著的關系。然而，由於經濟危機，這種關系似乎破滅了。
盡管美國勞動力市場沒有太蕭條，但是我們也沒有發現工資的大幅度上漲。這可能因為在當前複蘇期間的許多新工作的工資都較低或者是兼職的。換句話說，雖然經濟邏輯表明工資應該和工作一起上漲，機構性力量正在改變勞動力市場的組成，包括技術的進步和人口的老齡化，可能會抑制工資增長回到二戰後的水平。
當然，消費可以脫離收入。畢竟，收入增長的不利因素持續了幾十年，產生了家庭怎麼管理資金維持2008年危機前消費增長的問題。
這種現象的背後有許多因素：雙職工家庭的增加，儲蓄率的下降，政府轉移支出的巨大上升和幾十年來的家庭信貸擴張。但是這些因素似乎不再推動消費。
例如，職業女性的增加使許多家庭轉移了工資停滞不增長的影響。不幸的是，這種趨勢似乎已經結束。2000年到2014年，女性勞動力市場參與率從59%下降到56%，而且幾乎沒有恢複的迹象。
同時，雖然儲蓄率已經從上個年代的低谷反彈，仍低於歷史平均水平並且很可能因為老齡化人口的退休金需求需要進一步上升。
同時，考慮到政府將會面臨不斷增加的人口老齡化的負擔，轉移支付增加消費的趨勢可能不能持續。最後，考慮到消費者的債務占可支配收入水平還是很高，普通的美國家庭不太可能回到金融危機前的借貸習慣。
展望未來，這種變化意味著消費很可能保持低迷，至少和二戰後相比是這樣的。作為回應，市場的一部分可能是脆弱的：美國消費類股票表現比大盤好已經很多年了。他們的良好表現可能因為美國消費者不能回到過的榮耀時難以維持。
What’s Holding Back the U.S. Consumer
By Russ Koesterich | August 29, 2015
Most economists and investors understood that it was going to take some time for U.S. consumers to repair their overextended balance sheets after the 2008 crisis. But seven years after the bursting of the credit bubble, things haven’t changed much. Even as job growth has surged and gasoline prices have plunged, consumers are proving slow to respond.
Since the recession ended in 2009, U.S. real household consumption has remained well below the historical average. In the 60 years between 1947 and 2007, real household consumption grew annually by an average of 3.6 percent. Since 2008, it has been closer to 1.5 percent. Even if you exclude the recession, the average is still only around 2.3 percent.
The decline is partly a function of a measurement problem. In a service-driven, “sharing” economy, measuring consumption has become more difficult. That said, it’s hard to argue with the fact that something has changed.
In fact, as I write in my new Market Perspectives paper, “The Hangover: The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Consumer,” the slowdown in consumption predates the crisis. Indeed, the challenges facing U.S. households are tied to several secular trends that won’t be going away anytime soon.
One such trend: stagnating wages. Prior to the recession, there was a very consistent and statistically significant relationship between job creation and wage growth. However, since the financial crisis, that relationship seems to have broken down.
Though there likely isn’t much slack left in the U.S. labor market, we haven’t seen an accompanying broad pickup in wages. This may be because many of the new jobs in the current recovery are low paying or part time. In other words while economic logic suggests that wages should accelerate along with jobs, structural forces changing the makeup of the labor market—including advances in technology and an aging population—may inhibit wage growth from reverting back to the post-WWII norm.
Of course, spending can and does deviate from income. After all, stagnant income growth has been a persistent headwind for several decades, raising the question of how households managed to fund a fairly consistent period of rising consumption before the 2008 crisis.
There were a number of factors behind this phenomenon: the rise of the two-income family, a declining savings rate, a significant rise in government transfer payments and a multi-decade expansion in household credit. But these factors no longer appear to be tailwinds to consumption.
For instance, the rise of women in the workforce enabled many households to deflect the impact of stagnant real wage growth. Unfortunately, this rise seems to have run its course. Between 2000 and 2014, female labor market participation declined to 56 percent from 59 percent, and there are few signs of its imminent recovery.
Meanwhile, though the savings rate has rebounded from last decade’s lows, it remains well below the historical average and likely has further to rise given an aging population that needs to fund a longer retirement.
At the same time, given the increasing burden that an aging population will place on the federal government, the trend of transfer payments flattering consumption probably isn’t sustainable. Finally, it’s unlikely that the typical U.S. family can return to its pre-crisis borrowing habits, considering that consumer debt-to-disposable income levels are still relatively high from a historical perspective.
Looking forward, this changing landscape means consumption is likely to remain modest, at least as compared to the post-WWII norm. In response, one segment of the market may prove vulnerable: U.S. consumer stocks, which have been outperforming the broader market for a number of years. Their outperformance may be difficult to maintain in an environment in which U.S. consumers struggle to regain their old swagger.