11月30日，國際貨幣基金組織邀請人民幣加入國際儲備貨幣，並於2016年10月生效。中國立志在二十年内成為可靠的全球支付貨幣，而國際貨幣基金組織的批準則成為了重要的裡程碑。但各國央行暫時不會大量買入人民幣。
在各國央行7.8萬億美元的外匯儲備中，人民幣僅占1%。瑞士信貸預測，在未來的兩年中，央行的人民幣儲備極有可能增加到1500億美元至2000億美元，但超過7800億美元的可能性很低。這樣一來，人民幣將達到外匯儲備總額的2.5%-3%，
央行行長們不願意立刻開始囤積人民幣的原因有很多。首先，他們沒有義務這樣做。國際貨幣基金組織將人民幣納入特別提款權貨幣籃子，流入國家的資金構成了外匯儲備，而國家可以同他國央行交換特別提款權的貨幣，或是償還貨幣基金組織的債務。央行可以依據特別提款籃子還分配外匯儲備，但也不是必須這樣做，實際情況是，他們很少這樣做。
央行更傾向於按照實際需求來分配外匯儲備的比例。今年九月，人民幣成為第五大全球支付貨幣，占全球交易總量的2.5%。瑞士信貸預測，該數據會在2016年出現小幅增長，人民幣支付將達到全球交易的3%，人民幣的外匯儲備將接近3%，而達不到其他分析家所預測的兩位數。
中央銀行更願意持有最大交易夥伴的貨幣，但卻不願意依照同中國交易量的比例來儲備人民幣。那是因為同中國的貿易往來只有30%是用人民幣結算的，而同美國的貿易往來有90%用美元結算，同日本則為70%。
央行行長們願意儲備貨幣來償還外債，但是中國只占國際債券的0.6%，而國際銀行的負債則更低。隨著中國建立亞投行並提出“一帶一路”的投資主題，這些數字會逐漸增加，但短期内不會出現明顯的增長。
央行行長們必須對貨幣本身的價值進行評估。一方面，自2010年以來，人民幣相對大多數貨幣升值，而瑞士信貸認為中國的財政盈餘、低通脹率和較高的經濟增速都將推動人民幣進一步升值。另一方面，大量持有人民幣會有很高的風險，因為中國的固定收益和貨幣市場的流通性很低。今年夏天，中國放寬了外國投資者進入境内債券市場的要求，但交易量仍然很低。政府債券也是如此，國有銀行貢獻了80%的交易量。就貨幣市場本身而言，雖然政府在今年八月允許市場決定人民幣匯率，但政府仍頻頻加以幹涉。瑞士信貸稱，各國央行不願意增加人民幣外匯儲備是害怕中國政府突然中止人民幣或債券的交易。
央行對人民幣保持警惕的另一個原因是對中國財政系統的不信任，這也是特別提款權將長期影響的地方。加入特別提款籃子意味著中國要允許他國央行“隨意使用”人民幣。瑞士信貸認為，國際貨幣基金組織的認可會增加私人投資者投資中國債券市場的信心。瑞士信貸認為，貨幣儲備狀況將推動資本市場的開放並促使財務系統更加透明。正是這類改革促使基金組織批準人民幣入籃，而多年來中國力求在全球金融舞台上謀得一席之地，因此，中國也不願意破壞剛剛到手的局面。
Reserved: What Next for the Renminbi?
On November 30, the International Monetary Fund invited the renminbi to join the pound, euro, U.S. dollar, and yen in an exclusive club of international reserve currencies starting in October 2016. China has been working to make its currency a credible global player for at least two decades, and the nod from the IMF is a significant symbolic victory. Still, don’t expect central banks to scoop up mass quantities of renminbi just yet.
Central banks currently hold only about one percent of their $7.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves in renminbi. Credit Suisse thinks banks will add somewhere between $150 billion and $200 billion worth of the Chinese currency to their stockpiles over the next two years, with an outside chance of substantially more, up to $780 billion or so. That would bring the renminbi up to just 2.5 percent to 3 percent of total reserves, but capital inflows into China from central bank governors diversifying their holdings by adding renminbi would be useful in other ways – namely by offsetting China’s accelerating outflows and reducing the risk of another devaluation like the one in August.
There are a number of reasons central bankers are unlikely to be loading up on Chinese currency right away. For starters, they have no obligation to do so. The IMF included the renminbi in the basket of currencies that comprise its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) reserve asset, which the fund issues to countries to shore up their reserves. Countries can exchange SDRs for a reserve currency, trade them with other central banks, or use them to repay IMF debt. Central banks could base their reserve holdings on the weighting of the SDR basket, but they don’t have to, and in practice they rarely do.
Central bankers also tend to maintain currency reserves in proportion to their actual use. The renminbi was the fifth most used currency in the world in September, accounting for 2.5 percent of global transactions. In 2016, Credit Suisse sees a slight increase, estimating that 3 percent of global transactions will take place in renminbi – in line with their prediction that the currency will only rise to about 3 percent of total reserves, rather than the double-digit proportions other analysts have predicted.
Central banks also favor maintaining reserves of the currencies of their biggest trading partners, but they aren’t likely to hold renminbi in direct proportion to Chinese trade volumes. That’s because China settles just 30 percent of its trade in renminbi, compared to the 90 percent of American trade settled in dollars and 70 percent of Japanese trade in yen.
Central bankers do keep currencies around to pay down foreign debts, but China accounts for just 0.6 percent of international debt securities and an even lower proportion of international banking liabilities. With China leading the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure program, those numbers will eventually increase – but not for several years.
Central bankers also have to assess the merits of the currency itself. On one hand, the renminbi has appreciated significantly against most other currencies since 2010, and Credit Suisse believes China’s strong current account surplus, low inflation, and relatively high growth means it will continue doing so. On the other hand, there are risks to holding large quantities of renminbi, as both the fixed income and currency markets in China are relatively illiquid. China allowed foreign investors easier access to the onshore bond market this summer, but trading levels are still very low. In government bonds, too, state banks account for 80 percent of daily trading. In the currency markets themselves, while the government allowed market forces to play a larger role in determining the renminbi’s value this August, policymakers still intervene frequently. Credit Suisse says central banks have been reluctant to increase their renminbi holdings for fear that the government might suddenly halt trading in either the currency or Chinese bonds.
This last reason that central banks may remain wary of the renminbi – skepticism about the Chinese financial system – is where the SDR may have long-lasting effects. Inclusion in the SDR obligates China to allow other central banks to “freely use” the currency, and Credit Suisse believes the IMF stamp of approval may give more private investors the confidence to venture into Chinese debt markets. Credit Suisse believes that reserve-currency status will encourage official reforms that further open the capital account and make the financial system more transparent. It was reforms of that exact sort that played a key role in the IMF’s decision to add the renminbi to the SDR, and after years of vying for a spot on the global financial stage, China seems unlikely to want to jeopardize its newfound status.
本文翻譯由兄弟財經提供
本文來源：https://www.thefinancialist.com/reserved-what-next-for-the-renminbi/#sthash.68pXnpPa.dpuf