2016年初的那幾天，事實證明中國沒有逃過2015年的危機。1月4日的數據表明，中國的制造業連續第十個月收縮，隨後股市的大量抛售迫使政府暫停股市。全球市場都在下跌，而1月7日的新一輪波動迫使中國政府再次暫停股市交易。但近來談論中國的話題都忽略了一個事實，即中國公司仍給西方跨國企業帶來了極大的威脅。
跨國企業最擔心的是，在長期的過度投資之後，中國制造商開始降價。資本投資仍在中國GDP中占有44%的份額，高於日本在20世紀70年代的36%和韓國90年代的38%。中國在多個行業的投資都出現了產能過剩的情況，舉例來說，94.5%的鋼鐵產量都低於實際成本。這意味著西方鋼鐵制造商必須承擔中國公司帶來的價格下行風險。
中國國家發展改革委員會預測，約有6.8萬億美元的項目是穩賠不賺的，相當於中國GDP的70%。淨收益率長期低於發達國家水平，美國當前的淨收益率為9.6%，英國為6.4%，德國為5.8%，日本為5.1%，而中國僅有2.5%。
雖然企業的收益率低，但價格便宜、資金回收快，能夠維持投資水平，所以他們還會繼續這樣做。中國政府不會強迫國有企業降低產量或是允許公司破產來緩解產能過剩的情況。與之相反，他們會在企業出現問題時施以援手，因為他們不願意引發動亂或是給經濟增長拖後腿。企業想把過剩的產品出口到國外，因此降低價格來吸引買家。去年12月，中國生產者價格指數同比下降5.9%。
競争不僅體現在價格方面，中國公司也在緊鑼密鼓地提高產品質量。舉例來說，中國的汽車制造商正在逐漸縮小同西方制造商的差距。中國公司努力從外國合作夥伴身上吸取經驗。有的時候，中國官員會要求跨國企業在中國研發技術或是允許中國持有獨家知識產品。盡管官方承諾嚴打知識產品盜竊，但中國的知識產權保護機制仍有缺陷。
事實證明，中國制造的質量將會繼續提高。近十年來，中國在研發方面的投入增加了不止一倍，由GDP的0.6%增加至2%。中國創新人士在一年中申請的專利數量比美國多45%，但申請成功率遠低於美國。自20世紀90年代起，中國大學畢業生的數量增加了14倍，其中有不少大學生的技能可以應用於技術、工業闆塊，這兩個闆塊對中國來說具有重要的戰略意義。2015年，中國有750萬大學畢業生（美國僅有330萬），其中130萬持有科學或工程學學位，而美國僅有50萬人。
此外，官員們認為他們會直接加入戰略闆塊的企業中。在最新的五年計劃中，政府優先打造“國家冠軍企業”，這些企業涉及十個領域，其中包括信息技術、機器人技術、航空設備等，這些企業將會走在世界的頂端。舉例來講，中國的機器人公司將會在下一個十年中，從外國企業的手中搶占市場份額。政府的支持會加速他們的價值鍊並繼續搶占市場份額。
政府政策給中國企業特殊的待遇，包括在某些領域設置極高的準入門檻。谷歌、推特、臉書都被中國拒之門外，百度、新浪微博、優酷能企業便無需面對外國企業的威脅。很多人認為中國商務部的反壟斷裁決不是為了防止壟斷的出現，而是為了造福中國企業。
許多知名公司都在迅速地追趕西方的品質，而政府也不打算讓制造商倒閉或是大幅減產來解決產能過剩的問題。與之相反，政府致力於將中國企業推向世界領先的位置。脆弱的西方企業的投資者不要小瞧了他們。
Don’t Count China Out Yet
The first days of 2016 showed that China hasn’t escaped its 2015 woes. On January 4, new data showed that manufacturing activity slowed for the tenth consecutive month in December, and the ensuing sell-off in the stock market forced Chinese officials to halt trading mid-day. Global markets sank, and another bout of volatility on January 7 forced Chinese officials had to halt trading once again. But all the recent talk of China’s troubles has obscured the fact that the country’s companies still pose a formidable competitive threat to many Western multinationals.
The first concern for multinationals is that after a long period of overinvestment, Chinese manufacturers have been slashing prices. Capital investment still makes up a disproportionately large share of Chinese GDP – 44 percent, higher than in Japan (36 percent) or South Korea (38 percent) when those countries were building industrial capacity in the 1970s and early 1990s, respectively. All that investment has created enormous excess capacity in multiple sectors – 94.5 percent of Chinese steel production is produced below cost, for example. That means Western steelmakers will have to weather downward pressure on prices from Chinese firms that are willing to incur losses to move product.
China’s National Development and Reform Commission estimates that $6.8 trillion worth of projects – equivalent to 70 percent of China’s GDP – are making “highly ineffective” returns. Net profit margins, long lower than in the developed world, currently stand at just 2.5 percent, compared to 9.6 percent in the U.S., 6.4 percent in the U.K., 5.8 percent in Germany, and 5.1 percent in Japan.
Cheap, readily available capital has helped sustain investment levels and should continue doing so, despite corporations’ thin profit margins. Chinese banks offer favorable financing to state-owned and formerly state-owned enterprises, bankroll unprofitable projects, and roll over non-performing loans rather than force firms into default. Banks fund these subsidies to borrowers by paying depositors very little interest – 1.75 percent in a country growing some 7 percent a year. They also lend a relatively small percentage of their deposits. The loan-to-deposit ratio in China is just 67 percent. Credit Suisse analysts believe Chinese banks will continue rolling over non-performing loans until the loan-to-deposit rate reaches 100 percent, at which point the central bank could simply print money to prop up loans.
Chinese officials rarely intervene aggressively to reduce excess capacity by forcing state-owned enterprises to slow production or allowing more companies to go bankrupt. Instead, they step in to help them when they run into trouble, because they’re loath to stir up unrest or jeopardize economic growth. “We think that China…is operating a policy of employment maximization at the expense of profit maximization,” Credit Suisse’s equities analysts wrote in their 2016 outlook. Instead, companies have been trying to export their excess production, slashing prices to lure buyers. In December, China’s producer price index fell 5.9 percent from the previous year.
The competitive threat goes beyond prices, as Chinese companies are increasingly producing high-quality goods. Chinese automakers, for one, are quickly closing the quality gap with the West. (See chart) Domestic companies have learned quickly from foreign partners, many of which were forced to form joint ventures to do business in China. Sometimes, officials require multinationals to develop some technology in China or allow Chinese firms to own or have exclusive license to intellectual property. Not all partnerships are official – or consensual – either. China has very weak enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, despite official pledges to crack down on IP theft
Evidence suggests that the quality of Chinese production will keep improving. China has more than doubled spending on research and development from 0.6 percent of GDP 10 years ago to 2 percent. Chinese innovators apply for 45 percent more patents a year than those in the U.S., though fewer applications are successful. China produces 15 times more college graduates a year than it did in the 1990s, and many have the kinds of skills that can be put to good use in the technical, industrial sectors that China has flagged as strategically important. Out of 7.5 million Chinese graduates in 2015 (compared to 3.3 million in the U.S.), 1.3 million received degrees in science and engineering, compared to 500,000 in the U.S.
In addition, officials have indicated that they will directly subsidize companies in strategic industries. In its most recent five-year plan, the government prioritized creating “national champions” – companies that can become global leaders – in 10 industries, including information technology, robotics, and aerospace equipment. Domestic robotics companies, for example, are expected to take significant market share from foreign firms over the next decade. Such government support will allow companies to rise faster up the value chain and continue taking market share.
Official policies already give domestic companies preferential treatment in China, including high barriers to entry in certain industries. Google, Twitter, and YouTube are blocked, for example, allowing Baidu, Sina Weibo, and Youku to thrive without foreign rivals. The Ministry of Commerce has also been criticized for antitrust rulings that appear designed to benefit Chinese companies rather than prevent monopolies. Many of its most important firms are quickly catching up to those in the West in terms of quality, and the government has no intention of letting major manufacturers fail or forcing them to make dramatic cuts in production to deal with an excess supply problem. Quite the contrary, officials are doing a great deal to push Chinese firms to global prominence. Investors in vulnerable Western companies shouldn’t discount the idea that they will succeed.
本文翻譯由兄弟財經提供
文章來源：https://www.thefinancialist.com/14864/#sthash.shpNivcz.dpuf