美國綜合性商業公司崛起的時代已經過去了幾十年。20世紀60年代至70年代是綜合性企業嶄露頭角的黃金時期，但不過幾十年的時間，這些企業便紛紛破產，因為經濟趨勢已從多樣性轉變為專業性。但是在2016年，中國綜合性企業崛起的熱情達到了前所未有的高度，尤其是互聯網公司。去年，網絡巨頭百度、阿裡巴巴以及騰訊在134個商業領域共計投資了290億美元。
這三家企業中以阿裡巴巴為最，去年在收購和少數股權方面的投資比騰訊和百度加起來還要多。投資領域多種多樣，既有翻譯網站，也有房屋租賃。他們的投資領域難免有重合之處，阿裡巴巴和騰訊分別在外賣網站“餓了嗎”投資了12.5億美元和3.5億美元。
阿裡不但沒有放棄核心的電子商務，還不斷轉變商務策略。阿裡去年最大的一筆投資是以46億美元投資了實體電子產品零售商蘇甯。蘇甯的配送網絡將幫助阿裡完成訂單配送和產品儲存。而阿裡則將蘇甯的在線商城放置在天貓網站的首頁。
阿裡去年的另一大手筆是在傳媒領域，以35億美元收購了優酷土豆平台，並以20億美元收購了南華早報集團出版社的全部資產。這個不斷壯大的傳媒帝國最近還買入了中國最大私人電影公司、在線動漫平台、全資電視電影制作公司以及一家在線音樂平台的股票。
為什麼都是傳媒領域的投資？因為中國居民可支配的娛樂消費越來越多，截至2020年，中國的“文化產業”將會貢獻7%的GDP，約6萬億人民幣（合9300億美元）。阿裡認為傳媒行業最終也會回歸到電子商務領域。舉例來講，消費者可以通過阿裡的網站購買電影票，看一場阿裡制作的電影，在天貓買幾件電影相關的主題產品。
騰訊也在傳媒領域站住了腳，斥資一億美元投資影院購票軟件，主攻線下領域。因為缺少“線上線下”的連接，線下業務只能以現實世界的購買服務來吸引線上用戶，比如對滴滴快的的投資。2015年，騰訊推出了搭車服務、家政服務以及食品外賣服務。
騰訊更傾向於合作而不是收購，因此達成的交易比阿裡還要多，騰訊完成了68筆，而阿裡僅有45筆，但騰訊的交易金額卻比阿裡少了100億美元。騰訊進入外賣領域是因為有利可圖。外賣市場自2010年至2015年已由586億人民幣上漲至2160億人民幣，而在線下單將在2017年達到整體外賣業務的12%，這在2010年僅有0.15%。
百度也加入了送餐行列，不是通過企業收購，而是直接建立了自己的外賣平台“百度外賣”。這是瑞士信貸分析家認證的幾個成功的百度戰略之一。和騰訊一樣，百度的投資大多局限於少數股權收購。百度自2014年以來最大的一筆投資是以30億美元收購了糯米團購，這使得糯米在線下業務中更具競争力。百度之所以這樣做，是因為它是中國最大的搜索引擎，這是它得天獨厚的優勢。
互聯網巨頭們的現金充足，因此瑞士信貸分析家們認為他們會迎著宏觀經濟的壓力逆風而上。至少他們在短期内不會遇到什麼對手。消費性支出的增長已經超過了GDP的增長。這對互聯網巨頭來首是個好消息，只要消費者想買的，他們那裡都會有賣的。
China’s New Conglomerates
It’s been decades since conglomerates were the toast of American commerce. Many that formed in the 1960s and 70s broke up in the decades that followed, as the trend of diversification gave way to specialization. But in China in 2016, enthusiasm for the conglomerate form is at an all-time high, particularly among Internet companies. Last year, web titans Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent invested a total of $29 billion in 134 businesses.
Alibaba has been the most aggressive of the three, investing more in 2015 than Tencent and Baidu combined through acquisitions and minority stakes in companies ranging from a language translation site to a home rental service. But they’ve surely bumped into each other outside some conference rooms. Alibaba and Tencent invested $1.25 billion and $350 million, respectively, in minority stakes in the food delivery site ele.me and $2 billion each in Didi Kuadi, China’s largest car-hailing app.
Alibaba isn’t abandoning its core e-commerce business, but its e-commerce strategy is evolving. One of its biggest deals last year was a $4.6 billion investment in the brick-and-mortar electronics retailer Suning. Suning’s distribution network will help deliver Alibaba’s orders and stock some Alibaba products in its stores, while Alibaba will host Suning’s first online store on its Tmall shopping portal.
Alibaba’s other significant 2015 deals were in media: a $3.5 billion takeover of online video platform Youku Tudou, and a $2 billion deal to buy the assets of publisher SCMP Group. The company’s growing media empire also includes recently purchased stakes in China’s largest private film company and an online animation platform, as well as a wholly owned TV and film production company and an online music platform.
Why all the media investments? Because Chinese residents have growing disposable income to spend on entertainment, and the country’s “culture industry” is expected to contribute 7 percent to GDP — about 6 trillion renminbi ($930 billion) – by 2020. Alibaba also sees media as a way to drive business back to its e-commerce sites. Consumers could buy movie tickets through an Alibaba site, watch an Alibaba-produced film, and buy movie-themed merchandise on Tmall.
Tencent also has a foothold in media – including a new $100 million stake in a movie ticket app – but it has devoted the most attention to the O2O space. Short for “online to offline, ” O2O businesses attract online users to purchase services for use in the real world, which includes the above investments in Didi Kuadi and ele.me. In 2015, the company also invested in a ridesharing service, a housekeeping service, and a group deals site with a food delivery subsidiary.
Tencent tends to form partnerships rather than making outright acquisitions. As a result, it completed more deals than Alibaba in 2015 – 68 to Alibaba’s 45 – while spending $10 billion less. Its foray into O2O food delivery may prove particularly lucrative. The food delivery market has grown from 58.6 billion renminbi ($9 billion) in 2010 to 216 billion ($33.5 billion) in 2015, and online orders are expected to account for more than 12 percent of all food delivery in 2017, up from just 0.15 percent in 2010.
Baidu has also entered the food delivery business – not through M&A, but by developing its own platform, Baidu Food. That’s just one of several homegrown Baidu businesses that Credit Suisse analysts say are indicative of a more organic growth strategy. Other examples include an autonomous car business, an education business, and an online bank developed in partnership with a brick-and-mortar bank, China Citic Bank.
Baidu, like Tencent, limited itself to minority stakes last year, its largest being a $1.2 billion investment in Uber China. But Baidu is also pouring money into a major acquisition from 2014: the group-buying site Nuomi. The company announced last June that it would spend $3 billion to make Nuomi more competitive in the O2O space. In doing so, Baidu has an advantage others don’t: it is China’s dominant search engine.
The Internet giants are cash-rich, and Credit Suisse analysts expect their investment boom to continue despite macroeconomic headwinds. They may also face less competition than in recent years. Though the Chinese government directed some $231 billion to venture capital funds last year, Credit Suisse analysts say the funds have grown more cautious. Consumer spending growth, however, is outpacing GDP growth. That’s good news for the Internet giants, who are increasingly prepared to sell just about anything consumers want to buy.
本文翻譯由兄弟財經提供
文章來源：https://www.thefinancialist.com/chinas-new-conglomerates/#sthash.xziUwXJs.dpuf