現在不要放棄中國經濟的三個原因

現在人們對中國的讨論中充滿了悲觀情緒。自從去年八月的股市崩盤和今年第一季度不盡人意的經濟增長速度出現之後，人們現在習慣於對中國市場持看跌態度。最近，消極情緒又集中到了中國的債務水平、經濟增長放緩和改革進度緩慢上。

但是我們有不能放棄中國市場的很好原因。

中國的債務水平是個問題但是還沒達到即將發生危機的水平。

彭博社的數據顯示中國有很高的債務水平，比那些曾經經歷債務危機的新興市場的債務水平都要高得多。但是這個債務水平還遠低於危機水平，因為中國目前的債務性質不同。

首先，要考慮誰持有債務。在1994年墨西哥債務危機、1997年亞洲債務危機和2002年巴西危機期間，外國投資者是主要獲利者。相反，瑞士聯合銀行的數據顯示中國90%的債務都是國内持有。

其次，過去的危機都伴隨著貨幣貶值和國外資本撤回。在我看來，中國貨幣貶值的可能性很低。所以現在更重要的是中國投資者對債務危機的看法。諷刺的是中國的債務增長與中國公民有限投資選擇相關，他們僅能進行儲蓄或者投資債務。企業一直是大規模借款人，他們樂於發行債券向中國投資者支付利息。中國企業的債務水平從2007年GDP的102%增長到2015年GDP的165%。

國民儲蓄率能很好的平衡債務水平，一些人認為中國的儲蓄與債務水平相符。這一觀點的例子：中國的儲蓄率已經持續居高幾十年，在過去20年中平均的儲蓄率為GDP的45%。

中國經濟仍然具備增長潛力，僅僅是沒達到兩位數

最近中國GDP從1980年到2010平均10%的增長速度下降到低於7%使一些人認為即將面臨中等收入陷阱並且即將出現危險的增長速度下降勢頭。很多人都有這種擔心。中國實際的人均GDP是8100美元，而美國是56000美元，日本是33000美元，新興市場平均為10600美元。而且有過新興市場成功逃離中等收入陷阱的例子。

中國很可能將會受益於其龐大的人口基數。創造經濟增長不僅僅是創造就業，還需要有效的分配這些人力資源。戶口制度的放松意味著人們可以從鄉村搬到經濟增長更加有活力的城市。這個仍然在進行中的遷徙過程很可能將會促進未來中國經濟的增長。世界銀行的數據顯示，2014年末中國城鎮人口的比例為54%，而美國為81%，墨西哥為79%。最後，取消獨生子女政策將會增加家庭消費並減緩中國日益惡化的人口老齡化趨勢。

政策制定者意識到了需要做什麼

中國需要進行改革以支撐其長期的經濟增長潛力。目標是把經濟過度到一個基於消費而不是投資的更加穩定的環境中。 正如我們之前指出的，雖然因為週期性壓力最近的改革速度正在放緩，已經實現的改革還是對經濟增長有支撐作用的。其中包括國有企業的私有化和結構改革，例如上面提到的放寬戶口制度和獨生子女政策。

盡管我們最近採取用了一個對中國更加有利的觀點，但是我們還是認識到了對中國經濟增長的不利因素。過高的債務水平和過度的產能仍然是中國長期經濟增長的主要風險。如果債務問題得不到處理並繼續高速增長將會產生問題。

但是在其經濟增長曾經遇到諸多問題時，中國之前已經證明了懷疑者們是錯誤的。我們的總結是現在不要放棄中國經濟和中國企業，但是要做好中國經濟進入新篇章時出現波動的準備。

3 Reasons Not to Give Up on China (yet)

By Blackrock Author | May 30, 2016

Strong pessimism has become the norm when conversations gravitate to China. Ever since last August’s domestic stock market crash and disappointing first-quarter economic growth, being a China bear seems to have become more popular. Most recently, negative sentiment has focused on China’s debt level, slowing growth and sluggish implementation of reforms.

But there are good reasons not to give up on China just yet.

China’s debt level is a problem but not at an imminent debt-crisis level.

China certainly has a high absolute level of debt, with levels much higher than those seen in other emerging market (EM) countries who experienced debt crises, according to Bloomberg data. But an imminent debt crisis seems unlikely, due to the different nature of China’s current debt.

First, consider who owns the debt. During the Mexico debt crisis in 1994, the Asian debt crisis in 1997 or the Brazil crisis in 2002, foreign investors were the dominant stakeholder. In contrast, according to UBS, more than 90 percent of Chinese debt is currently domestically owned. 

Second, past crises centered around currency devaluations and foreign money flowing out. The potential for a Chinese currency devaluation is low, in our opinion. So, now it’s more about how Chinese investors feel about the debt issue. The irony is that the growth of Chinese debt is related to Chinese citizens’limited set of investment options: invest in debt or save (as capital controls restrict money from flowing out of the country). The corporate sector has been a large borrower, happy to issue debt to provide interest to the Chinese investor. Corporate debt grew from 102 percent of Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 to 165 percent by 2015, as the chart below shows.

The national savings rate may in fact justify the high debt level, as some have argued, with Chinese savings matched to debt issuance. Case in point: China’s gross savings rate has been high for decades, averaging around 45 percent of GDP for the last 20 years, per the World Bank.

The Chinese economy still has the potential to grow, just not at double-digit rates.

The recent decline in China’s GDP to below 7 percent from an average of 10 percent from 1980 to 2010 has some worried that the country is on the verge of hitting the middle-income trap, and a dangerous downward growth streak is ahead. The numbers contest this worry. China’s real GDP per capita (person) is $8,100, compared with $56,000 in the U.S., $33,000 in Japan and an EM average of $10,600. Furthermore, there have been instances where EM countries have managed to escape the middle-income trap.

China is also likely to benefit from its 1.2 billion population. Creating economic growth will not only be about bringing people into the labor force, but it’ll also be about how to allocate those human resources efficiently. The relaxation of the Hukou system means people can move from rural areas to cities where economic growth is vibrant. This relocation process, still in progress, is likely to support growth going forward. According to the World Bank, China’s urban population was 54 percent at the end of 2014 versus 81 percent in the U.S. and 79 percent in Mexico. Lastly, the elimination of the one-child policy has the potential to boost household consumption in the short term and to slow China’s worsening demographic picture over the longer run.

Policymakers recognize what needs to be done.

Reforms need to be implemented to support the country’s long-term growth potential. The goal is to transition the economy to a more sustainable and stable path based around consumption rather than investment. And, as I’ve written before, though the pace of reform has slowed lately due to cyclical pressures, the reforms that have been implemented are ones that are supportive to growth. These include the privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and structural reforms, like the relaxing of the Hukou system and the one-child policy mentioned above.

Though we have adopted a more favorable view of China lately, we are cognizant of headwinds to Chinese growth. Excessive leverage and overcapacity remain major risks for the country’s long-term growth prospects. Debt levels that are left unmanaged and allowed to grow exponentially would create problems.

But China has proved the skeptics wrong before, experiencing many bumps along its road to economic power. Bottom line: Don’t give up on the Chinese economy and Chinese equities just yet, but be prepared for market volatility as China’s new chapter is written.