顧維鈞在1919年巴黎和會上拒簽對德和約(8)

  “Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asian, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

  (1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men?o?war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

  (2) To deliver on a date not later than the 15th September, 1914. To the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition and compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same China.”

  Since the occupation of Kiaochow, Japan had been in actual possession. In view of all that had passed between the Government of China and Japan, Baron Makino thought that China fully realized the import of Japanese occupation. The friendly interchange of views on this subject had been entered into, and Japan had agreed to restore Kiaochow as soon as Japan had free disposal of the place. Agreements had been reached with regard to the leased railways.

  As notes had been exchanged, he thought that a statement of these engagements might be worth the consideration of the members of the Council.

  President Wilson asked Baron Makino whether he proposed to lay these notes before the council.

  Baron Makino said that he did not think the Japanese Government would raise any objection, but as the request was an unexpected one, he would be compelled to ask its permission.

  President Wilson asked on before of China if Mr. Koo would do likewise.

  Mr. Koo said that Chinese Government had no objection to raise.

  M. Clemenceau asked both the Japanese and Chinese Delegates to state whether they would make known to the council the conditions of the restoration agreed between them.

  Baron Makino said that he would do so, provided his Government would make no objection. He did not think it would. If it were within his power, he would produce these documents as soon as possible. There was, however, one point he wished to make clear. Japan was in actual posse?ssion of the territory under consideration. It had taken it by conquest from Germany.

  Before disposing of it to a third party, it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany.

  President Wilson pointed out that the council was dealing with territories and cessions previously German without consulting Germany at all.

  Baron Makino said that the work now in hand was one of preparation for the presentation of the case to Germany. It followed therefore that the cession of Kiaochow would have to be agreed upon by Germany before it was carried out. What should take place thereafter had already been the subject of an interchange of views with China.

  Mr. Koo said that China did not quite the same view as Baron Makino regarding the restoration of Kiaochow. He was far from desiring, in his statement of China’s cases, even to intimate that Japan, after obtaining the leased territory and other rights in Shantung from Germany, would not return them to China. In fact, he added, China had every confidence in Japan’s assurance to her and the world that she, Japan, would not retain them herself; and he was particularly glad to hear Baron Makino confirm these assurances before the Conference. But there was a choice between direct and indirect restitution. Of the two China would prefer the first. It was always easier to take one step than two if it led to the same place.

本文摘自《錢其琛作序推薦》


顧維鈞在1919年巴黎和會上拒簽對德和約(8)   世界發生了重大而又深刻的變化,我們的時代已經從戰爭與革命的時代進入了以和平與發展為主題的時代。在以和平與發展為主題的時代里,外交的作用上升,事實上中國的外交已經迎來了一個黃金時期。吳建民同志這本《外交案例》用作教材我認為是一件好事。